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Abstract: This paper provides a brief review of media ecology. It is partly a micro-history of the
tradition, and partly a philosophical clarification of how and why “systems-theory orientations,”
literacy studies, and the rapid spread of new media were all essential to its germination, growth, and
proliferation. Finally, the paper offers concluding remarks regarding social constructionist thought
and how it relates to the media ecology tradition.
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1. Introduction
To explore the ancestry line of media ecology, we first need to touch upon media ecology today,
and then, after considering its current composition, we can identify its roots as well as the soil and
overall atmosphere in which it sprouted and developed. This implies that we must differentiate
between a history of media ecology as a field of study and a history of the ideas and thinkers that
precipitated and nourished the emergence of the media ecology tradition in North America. The
following, therefore, is partly a micro-history of the tradition and partly a philosophical clarification of
how and why “systems-theory orientations”, literacy studies, and the rapid spread of new media were
all essential to its germination, growth, and proliferation. Finally, a concluding remark addresses how
social constructionist ideas relate to the media ecology tradition.
The particular expression, “media ecology”, grew out of a conversation in 1967 between Neil
Postman, Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan [1,2], and, within a year, Postman was using it in
public talks. By 1971, New York University (NYU), Postman’s home institution, had established a
doctoral program by that name, and then, in 1998, NYU, The Toronto School of Media Studies, and St.
Louis University joined resources to form the Media Ecology Association (MEA). Within four years of
its establishment, the MEA launched an international journal, Explorations in Media Ecology, and, today,
several books series are devoted to media ecology.
For many scholars, especially members of the MEA, media ecology refers to the study of
media as environments and environments as media [1–3]. It focuses upon dominant communication
technologies to account for both cross-cultural conflict as well as for the distinguishing characteristics
of a given culture and/or historical period. Although media ecological thinking can be found back in
the ancient world (e.g., admonishments against making “graven images”, or in Plato’s Phaedrus, where
Socrates warns about the effects writing will have on memory and people’s sense of wisdom), it was not
until the 20th century that media ecological thought became more prevalent within popular sensibilities.
Today, in the ultramodern 21st century, media ecological orientations are pervasive, mainly because
communication technologies have altered countless patterns of interaction before people’s very eyes:
many people have witnessed cell phones change the nature of social interaction, video technologies
alter notions of privacy, and robotic automation change the nature and meaning of employment. Hence,
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spanning and integrating ancient, modern and postmodern world-views, media ecology examines
cultures and personhood as intricately intertwined with dominant communication technologies.
Three roots serve as the main nutrient sources to the media ecology tradition: Marshall McLuhan,
Walter J. Ong, and Neil Postman [1–3]. These three—McLuhan arguably at the center—constitute a
core, with a number of scholars branching out from that core. So, for example, thinkers such as Harold
Innis, Lewis Mumford, Eric Havelock, Jack Goody, Susanne Langer, Edmund Carpenter, Elizabeth
Eisenstein, Jacques Ellul occupy a major inner layer of branches, and then thinkers such as Ludwig
Bertalanffy, Alfred Korzybski, Kenneth Boulding, Erving Goffman, Edward Hall, Dorothy Lee, Daniel
Boorstin, Gregory Bateson, Paul Watzlawick, Tony Swartz, Susan Sontag, Denise Schmandt-Besserat,
James Carey, David Olson, Leonard Shlain, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Julian Jaynes occupy a
further layer. There are also a number of contemporary scholars in the MEA who have produced books,
manuscripts, and who remain active in the organization. This includes but is not limited to: Lance
Strate, Thom Gencarelli, Janet Sternberg, Paul Levinson, Paul Soukup, Susan Barnes, Casey Lum, Paul
Grosswiler, Sara van den Berg, Robert K. Logan, Brett Lunceford, Fernando Gutiérrez, Sheila Nayar,
Ellen Rose, Brian Cogan, Phil Rose, Edward Tywoniak, Peter K. Fallon, Alex Kuskis, Steven Reagles,
Valerie V. Peterson, Peter Zhang, Eric Jenkins, Robert MacDougall, and myself. And, finally, there
are also many thinkers who contemporary media ecologists have enlisted as within the bounds of
media ecology, scholars such as Elias Canetti, Georg Simmel, J.J. Gibson, René Girard, and Guy Debord
among others.
2. The Larger Environment
Now that a few remarks have been made about media ecology today, we are ready to explore
the soil and atmosphere in which the seedling took root. Media ecology, as may be evident from the
scholars listed above, is not reducible to a single tradition or particular line of scholarship or even
to a single discipline. Joshua Meyrowitz suggests that the specific, substantiating research lines of
media ecology “have developed out of distinct disciplines (the classics, psychiatry, English, religion,
anthropology, history, etc.),” and, accordingly, these works are not “generally conceived of as being
parts of one body of literature” [4] (p. 22). Nevertheless, one complex multidisciplinary body of
literature is exactly what media ecology has become.
As far back as the 1960’s, Postman sought to express how multiple sources of thought were
growing together, intertwining if only underground. He, along with Charles Weingartner, used
the expression: “the Sapir-Whorf-Korzybski-Ames-Einstein-Heisenberg-Wittgenstein-McLuhan-et
al. Hypothesis” [5] (p. 101). The motive behind this unwieldy agglutination—the expression that
grew into “media ecology”—was to suggest that individuals across many different fields had come to
some remarkably similar (or at least highly resonant) insights regarding humanity, perception, cultural
evolution, and the constitution of social/psychological order. It also stressed the primacy of “relations”
over “things” and pointed to mediation as a dynamic mode of connectivity. Postman and Weingartner
promoted what Dewey and Bentley, in Knowing and the Known, called “trans-action” in distinction to
mere “inter-action.” More precisely differentiated, Dewey and Bentley write:
Inter-action: where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection. Trans-action:
where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases
of action, without final attribution to “elements” or other presumptively detachable or
independent “entities”, “essences”, or “realities”, and without isolation of presumptively
detachable “relations” from such detachable “elements.” [6] (p. 108).
Increasing numbers of scholars were growing more and more suspicious of a detached observer,
of assumptions regarding value-free language, of belief in a world complete unto itself to which
persons and/or their material conditions could be added without any impact or effect. Postman and
Weingartner sought accounts aligned with the idea that the “observer” cannot be separated from the
“observed”, especially where matters of technological mediation are concerned [5].
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One of media ecology’s main assumptions is that we can best understand technological mediation
and the evolution (e.g., the socio-historical/material constitution) of human consciousness and culture
through a systems-view. In 1974, Lee Thayer, a multidisciplinary systems theorist, established the
journal titled Communication, with an astonishing editorial board that included not only Marshall
McLuhan and Walter Ong, but such notable scholars as: Herbert Blumer, Daniel Boorstin, Kenneth
Boulding, Kenneth Burke, George Gerbner, Harold Lasswell, Claude Levi-Strauss, Floyd Matson,
F. S.C. Northrop, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Karl Pribram, Anatol Rapoport, David Riesman, Jurgen Ruesch,
Wilber Schramm, Harley Shands, and Geoffery Vickers. As one of the intellectual predecessors to the
MEA’s current journal Explorations in Media Ecology, Communication brought together scholars from
many different fields, areas such as psychology, sociology, physics, biology, engineering, mathematics,
economics, etc. All were realizing how their fields of study and bodies of knowledge were caught
within language practices and communication technologies more generally.
The 1960’s and 70’s witnessed a flood of scholarly reflection upon communication and symbolic
processes not only because many fields were discovering how their objects of investigation were
mediated, but also because of the rise of the telecommunication industries. Television, in particular,
was central to burgeoning interest in media studies across North America. As TV sets entered people’s
homes, they poured out social unrest: concerns over gender and racial inequality, political strife, rapid
shifts in values, and varieties of global conflict [4,7].
But other important elements in the soil need to be mentioned. In particular, the 20th century
not only witnessed the first large scale attempt at universal mass education, it watched the project
buckle under the weight of television and other electronic media. By the end of the century many
people were concerned over growing illiteracy rates. Moreover, many scholars had become much
more sophisticated in their inquires into the character and nature of alphabetic literacy. The year 1963
is marked by some scholars as a pivotal year for media ecological research [8]. Within a span of a
little over twelve months, McLuhan’s The Gutenberg Galaxy [9], Havelock’s Preface to Plato [10], Goody
and Watt’s “Consequences of Literacy” [11], and Levi-Strauss’s The Savage Mind [12] all were first
published. These texts provocatively identify significant changes in the nature of the spoken word and
in the nature of communicative practices with the advent of literacy; they pointed to the important
role literacy had played in making the modern Western world.
Two other notable contributions were David Olson’s The World on Paper [13] and Jack Goody’s The
Interface between the Written and the Oral [14]. Both masterfully address some of the more salient research
lines on literacy at the roots of media ecology [13–18]. One line came out of psychology and concerned
scholars such as Vygotsky, who claimed that certain mental abilities were dependent upon literacy,
almost as if literacy single-handedly transforms basic intellectual operations. Along similar lines,
Alexander Luria tested illiterate peasants to illustrate their apparent inability (or at least unwillingness)
to think with abstract categories and/or to accept syllogistic reasoning [9]. Another line of contributions
came from anthropology, especially turn of the century thinkers such as Sir James George Frazer, with
his massive The Golden Bough [19] as well as Lucien Levi-Bruhl’s highly influential The Notebooks on
Primitive Mentality [20]. These two popular and widely read anthropologists significantly influenced
subsequent thinking regarding the differences between “savages” and “civilized” human beings. Sylvia
Scribner and Michael Cole, in their book The Psychology of Literacy camped all of the aforementioned
thinkers together, basically accused them of something akin to technological determinism, and then
set out to experimentally test the claim that literacy alters human consciousness and turns “savages”
into “civilized human beings” [21]. Through a series of studies, they substantially refuted any claim
to a great divide between oral and literate mind and sought to show, more modestly, the possibility
of changes in skills but not general abilities. Along the way, however, they misunderstood and
misrepresented the view that Goody, in particular, was espousing, and this returns us to the original
point of departure about bringing systems-theory to the evolution (and socio-historical/material
constitution) of human consciousness and culture.
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An essential part of the task, as Goody identifies it, is to overcome the deeply entrenched kinds of
“mentalism” in contemporary psychology [14]. That is, contemporary experimental psychology often
traffics in the distinction between “abilities” and “skills” and therein reifies an “ahistorical”, “acultural”
mentalist sort of subject. This can be witnessed when Scribner and Cole try to test for something like
abstract logical abilities as they could be produced by literacy. For Goody, in contrast, the main point
is: what kinds of thought can people have—both in the short term and in the long term—because of
pen and paper? In some ways, Goody was addressing what decades later would be called, “embodied
cognition.” The point is that the contemporary psychological distinction between “abilities” and “skills”
is highly problematic. There’s no such thing as “abilities” or “skills” in the abstract, that is, without the
particular context and material conditions for the exercise of those abilities/skills. When we change
our methods and means of communication we’re actually changing the material conditions in which
any skill or ability would develop or have influence. Goody employs the term “capacities” to undercut
the ability/skill differentiation. I quote Goody at length:
. . . I myself could not, do not, remember the telephone number of my own office. That
does not stop me from calling my colleagues because I look the number up in my telephone
book, store it in my short-term memory, then dial. Now that I have a new type of telephone
with its own memory I don’t even need to look it up. My memory skills are not engaged.
Yet I have a capacity to talk to vast numbers of people on this earth at short notice.
To expect that this capacity would show up on a series of tests suffers from three theoretical
difficulties. It assumes, first, that such capacities can be described, or better described,
at a higher level of generality. Secondly, that this higher level of generality shows up in
the “higher” mental processes. Thirdly, that these higher mental processes go on inside
the mind alone. This last sentence sounds like a tautology. But if one defines skills and
knowledge as “mental” in the sense that they are entirely contained within the mind,
and have to be so tested, you quickly reach a point of no entry into the study of human
interaction . . . We are touching here upon the external-internal problem that has dogged
so much thinking, in psychology, philosophy, and elsewhere . . . Norbert Weiner asked
his readers to imagine a mechanic with an artificial arm trying to repair an engine. Is the
arm part of the machinery with which he is struggling, or part of the mechanic who is
working on the engine? . . . When a map or book intervene between the object and subject
we are dealing with ‘mind’ out there as well as with mind inside . . . writing presents us
with an instrument capable of transforming our intellectual operations from the inside; it is
not simply a question of a skill in the limiting sense but a change of capacity. The capacity
depends upon interaction between individual and the objects mediated by writing, and so
cannot in many cases be mocked-up in ways that would test general abilities (for example,
of abstract reasoning and memory) . . . [14] (pp. 253–256).
Scholars can continue to raise questions about what effects a technology has upon a person’s
general “abilities” or inner “mental” constructs, but they need not do so. On the contrary, they might
chose to carefully document how individuals and/or whole cultures have been capacitated to function
with technologies as extensions and as environments [13].
McLuhan’s well-known response to General Sarnoff’s claims regarding media effects cut directly
to this point [7]. Sarnoff, talking about the relationship between technologies and their consequences,
suggested, “The products of modern science are not in themselves good or bad; it is the way they are
used that determines their value,” to which McLuhan critically responded, “That is the voice of the
current somnambulism . . . It has never occurred to General Sarnoff that any technology could do
anything but add itself on to what we already are” [7] (p. 23).
Media ecology grew, then, on one front, from a desire to show how print based literacy was
blinding people to simultaneous interconnections and, on another front, from the nutrient soil
provided by the electric age. Only as electric technologies began to be pervasive could the systematic
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complexity of social and psychological relations afforded by print be revealed. Atomistic, linear, and
compartmentalized thought was the natural outcome of print, the symptom, as it were, of literate
sensibilities. The abstract proclivity to separate “content” from “form” and the tendency to isolate
items into a “one-thing-at-a-time” sequence of causal relations were products of literacy and obstacles
to apprehending the dynamic nature of technological mediation.
Something should be said in this context about McLuhan’s use of “formal cause”. A key principle
informing McLuhan’s thought, one that only recently has come to adequate attention, was McLuhan’s
attunement to formal causality [22–24]. Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causality: material,
efficient, formal, and final. For example, consider a spoon. It needs to be made of some material (steel,
wood, plastic, etc.), and the materials must be fashioned in a particular sequence or process by the
maker. In addition to these material and efficient causes, there are formal and final causes. The formal
cause of the spoon is what the maker had in mind in setting out to produce the spoon. It is the idea
guiding processes and expectations, thus enabling anyone to recognize the spoon “as” a spoon. Formal
cause, therefore, enables the maker to know when the fashioning of the spoon is completed, when
other people can clearly see “what it is”. The final cause of the spoon is its “for-the-sake-of-which”, the
reason we wish to have the spoon, the end served by the spoon: a particular kind of eating. McLuhan
appreciated how any environment or technology, as formal cause, grows an appetite, an orientating
capacity, a set of sensibilities that seek satisfaction elsewhere. Formal cause is not only the source of
“rear-view mirror” thinking (seeing the present through the past; e.g., “horseless carriage”), it is also
what gives media forms the “Midas touch”, the sense that anything touched by a media form gets
made over in its image [7]. For example, print, as formal cause, had groomed people for uniformity,
seriality, standardization, and lineal “one-thing-at-a-time” reasoning in countless areas of their lives,
and, so too, the electric age was the formal cause of ground-awareness, attention to simultaneity, and
interest in “relations” and “systems” rather than in “things” and their “properties”.
Consider the NRA’s slogan, “Guns don’t kill people, people do” [2,7]. Such analytic
compartmentalization typifies the need for a more robust systems-view of gun violence. Lance
Strate, in his elucidation of the media ecology traditions, suggests, “If you disagree with this argument,
and believe that there is greater potential for violence with firearms than without them, then you
believe that the medium is the message” [2] (p. 130). Not only are there, annually, hundreds of
accidental gun deaths in the US, but only the most literal-minded person could believe that anyone
thinks “guns,” in and of themselves, kill people. No one imagines that a gun somehow manufactures
itself, fills itself with ammunition, hops off of a gun rack and starts shooting. The bogus separation of
guns from people is already the literate dis-orientation, the non-systems view. Guns are extensions of
people, and people who have extended themselves with guns kill more people than people who do not
have such extensions. The systems-view informing the media ecological tradition would encourage
people to understand how a technology does not merely get added to an environment; it changes
everything. Paul Levinson nicely captures this issue where he writes that “The addition of a drop of
blue dye to a glass of water results not in blue dye plus water, but in blue water: a new reality,” as
cited in [25] (p. 35).
3. Final Remarks
Before closing, one final observation should be made regarding the growth and proliferation
of social constructionist thought, a neo-Marxist view that enlivened long-standing concern over the
difference and/or relationship between “nature” and “nurture”.
Social constructionist thought is mentioned only because it alludes to the rocky soil and arid
conditions that motivated some scholars to seek the greener pastures of the media ecological tradition.
Many who went to college in the 1980 and graduate school in the 1990s remember how popular
social constructionist ideas were [26]. It was hard to go anywhere and not hear something (anything
and everything) being described as “socially constructed”. As a response, some scholars sought to
more rigorously document the phenomenological constitution underlying social construction [27].
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Phenomenological focus upon the body, especially the difference between the senses, offered a needed
corrective to many social constructionist positions, but even a phenomenologically-informed social
constructionist view seemed, all said, pretty lacking in historical depth and breadth [28–30].
Media ecology, more than any other tradition, provides a more robust manifestation of what
so many social constructionist scholars had been seeking. We might call it, “socio-historical
constructionism with teeth.” Clearly, it is one thing to sweepingly proclaim that people socially
construct “reality” or to vaguely suggest that “gender” or “race” or “self” or “intelligence” or “science”
is socially constructed. It is quite a different matter to engage the socio-historical material technological
conditions—the total human environment—which built the cultures and selves we now experience
and take-for-granted. To explore the nature of alphabetic literacy, to learn how literate noetics alter and
work with oral noetics, to examine features of social organization accomplished by printed material, to
consider the effects of money on the experience of valuation and on practical commerce, to grapple
with how calendars and clocks shape and organize our experience of time and social interaction,
and to anticipate the likely side effects of new social media, these are main staples of today’s media
ecological research.
The overall human environment includes and incorporates technological extensions, and these
are never merely add-ons. They alter our sensibilities and capacities, our notions of self and other, our
notions of privacy and propriety, and our orientations in space and time. By bringing a systems-view to
technological mediation, media ecology both undercuts the “one-thing-at-a-time” rationality fostered
by print literacy and also provides a strategic vantage for understanding the kinds of changes currently
afoot in the new media landscape.
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